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Abstract: This article reexamines the practices of small-footprint
military interventions in light of the concept of “tipping points” as
conceived by Thomas C. Schelling. If the concept is accurate, it can
improve how we conduct such interventions.

P

opular accounts of civil wars and insurgencies are filled with
references to “windows of opportunity” and “tipping points”—
moments in time when the dynamics of a conflict are supposedly
shifting in ways that may portend a decisive change in a war’s trajectory.
These concepts have been used in mainstream media accounts, professional journals, and special reports to explain recent events in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Syria, and elsewhere.
If windows of opportunity and tipping points accurately describe
critical junctures in conflicts and can be identified either ahead of time
or as they occur (rather than solely through the benefit of hindsight),
the policy implications are substantial. After the painful experiences of
Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is committed to avoiding largescale entanglements in other nations’ internal conflicts, seeking instead
to “develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to
achieve our security objectives.”1 Unfortunately, US military doctrine
and numerous other sources make clear that decisive intervention in
civil wars and insurgencies typically is a manpower-intensive and costly
endeavor.2 If there are particular moments in time when a conflict is at
a critical turning point, it may be possible for small-scale interjections
of external forces to have disproportionately large effects. Conversely, if
there are only short-lived opportunities in which the course of a conflict
might be turned without a massive commitment of resources, then that
knowledge might help the United States better identify when it should
avoid intervention.
Despite the widespread appeal of concepts like windows of opportunity and tipping points to explain the trajectories of civil wars around
the globe, there have been few attempts to apply them in a systematic way
and even fewer efforts to explain their implications for foreign military
intervention.3 As they are typically used, the terms do not distinguish
between simple changes in a conflict’s trajectory—potentially fleeting
and insignificant—and more meaningful junctures.
1     US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 3.
2     US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (December 2006);
James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995):
59–69.
3     For exceptions, see Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, MG-965-MCIA, 2010); Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A.
Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28,
no. 2 (2007): 321–367; and I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in
International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, eds. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2000).
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This article explores the concept of a tipping point and its implications for America’s reliance on low-cost, small-footprint approaches to
stabilizing embattled partner governments. More specifically, the article
asks two questions: Are there identifiable opportunities in the course of
an insurgency in which even relatively small actions could help tilt the
conflict decisively in favor of the government? And if so, how can the
United States best take advantage of these opportunities?4

Tipping Points

The concept of tipping was first formalized by the Nobel Prizewinning economist Thomas Schelling.5 Tipping points are a subset
of “critical mass” or “threshold” dynamics in which the behavior of
a certain proportion of the population—a proportion that is different
in every circumstance—causes others to behave in a similar manner,
leading to cascading effects. Tipping point dynamics typically occur as
an iterated process. In the first step, a “critical mass” or “threshold”
number of people makes a particular decision—for instance, to participate in a protest against a regime. Their behavior, in turn, provides
information that causes other people to act in a similar fashion. After
witnesses of an anti-regime demonstration observe that the regime did
not engage in violent repression, they may become emboldened to participate themselves.6 As more and more people make the same decision,
pressures continue to mount on those who had initially opposed such
behavior. Loyalists, for instance, might have preferred that a regime stay
in place, but once most of their neighbors change loyalties, they may
feel uncomfortable, or even unsafe, engaging in public support of the
regime. This description of tipping points assumes that relatively small
events can have disproportionately large consequences if they lead to the
crossing of certain thresholds.7 The crossing of such a threshold may not
be necessary to achieve a particular outcome (for example, the overthrow
of a regime, which might collapse due to foreign invasion or other causes
unrelated to tipping point dynamics), but it should be sufficient.
The concept of a “window of opportunity” has already been applied
extensively to internal conflicts, particularly in the form of William
Zartman’s arguments about the “ripeness” of conflicts for negotiated settlements. Tipping points, on the other hand, have not seen a
similarly sustained discussion, despite the fact that journalists, experts,
and practitioners frequently invoke the concept to explain conflicts or
argue for or against intervening in them.8 If tipping points truly are
sufficient to propel a conflict toward one outcome or another, being
4     This discussion is entirely focused on efforts to secure an end to conflict on terms favorable to the
partner government, rather than on efforts to topple foreign governments. Tipping point dynamics are
likely to be very different in the case of efforts to overthrow other governments; see Stephen Biddle,
Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002).
5     Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 99–102.
This concept was popularized in Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a
Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2000).
6     Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution
of 1989,” World Politics 44, no. 1 (October 1991): 7–48.
7     Economists describe this situation as “increasing returns to scale.” For a closely related discussion of increasing returns, see Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study
of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 251–267.
8     For partial exceptions see Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, and McCormick, Horton,
and Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars.”
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able to identify them reliably and to understand their implications for
foreign intervention is perhaps even more important than understanding windows of opportunity. Conflicts may tip in a variety of ways:
toward resolution (an end to large-scale violence), toward qualitative
differences in the nature of a conflict (such as from political to more
criminal forms of violence, or from predominantly ideological to ethnic
or other communal ends), toward a new equilibrium at a higher or lower
intensity of violence, or toward a change in geographic expanse (such as
from cities into rural hinterlands or from containment within a single
country to spillover throughout a region). Each of these changes has
implications for American strategic interests. Those interests may be
secured by tipping a conflict toward one outcome or another, such as
by confining it to rural peripheries or by containing it within a single
country. Of particular importance is the relationship between tipping
points and conflict termination.

When Do Tipping Points Occur?

If tipping points can only be identified after the fact, when hindsight
has made a particular course of events appear inevitable, then they are of
little use to policymakers. While it is impossible to specify tipping points
across a broad range of conflicts, previous work on the dynamics of war
termination suggest several broad categories of events in which tipping
points would most likely occur.
Belligerents will continue to fight so long as the expected returns
(based on each party’s perceptions of the balance of power) exceed
the anticipated returns from negotiation. Consequently, tipping points
should emerge from one of three sources: a change in the balance of
power, a similar change in the expected benefits of peace, or new developments that significantly alter the parties’ perceptions of either of the
sources just discussed. The list of events provided below is only intended
as a summary of the most commonly cited potential tipping points.

Changes in the Balance of Power

In order to fight, a belligerent requires people to take up arms and to
provide support to the fighters, resources with which to fight (weapons,
money, and so on), and an organization and leadership to connect the
various elements of the struggle and give them purpose. Sufficient
degradation of any of these factors might induce a tipping point in a
conflict. More typically, a tipping point evolves when several of these
factors interact with one another.
•• Resources. One of the strongest predictors of a decisive turn in a war
is the loss of foreign state sponsorship to one or more of the parties
to the conflict, particularly if easily lootable natural resources are not
readily available to compensate for the shortfall.9 Especially in those
cases where an insurgency gained much of its support through material incentives (for example, cash payments, opportunities for looting),
the loss of revenues may touch off a cascade of defections.10 At least
9     Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End; Stephen Watts, “Enforcing Democracy? Assessing
the Linkages between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Democratization,” paper presented at
Columbia University’s International Politics Seminar, March 2009.
10     Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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a half-dozen cases of wars that terminated decisively in the post-Cold
War era were tied either directly (for example, Cambodia, El Salvador,
Mozambique, and Nicaragua) or indirectly (for example, Guatemala
and South Africa) to the end of the Cold War and the elimination of
the resources both superpowers had been directing to their proxies.
The loss of markets for contraband can significantly weaken a faction,
but it seldom is as decisive as the loss of state sponsorship due to the
presence of alternative markets and the existence of other criminal
opportunities (for example, kidnapping for ransom).11
•• Organization and Leadership. Without leaders and structures in
place to guide fighters, an insurgency is no more than widespread
mob violence. Disrupting a faction’s organization can, therefore,
have potentially decisive effects. Two of the most powerful means
to disrupt an insurgency are attacks on the group’s leadership and
the creation of splits among different factions within an insurgency.12
The capture of the leaders of the Shining Path movement in Peru
(Abimeal Guzmán), the Kurdistan People’s Party in Turkey (Abdullah
Ocalan), and UNITA in Angola (Jonas Savimbi) are often cited as
examples of successful “decapitation” that led to a rapid disintegration
of movements that had previously been strong.13 Although evidence
suggests that successful leadership targeting produces important
short- to medium-term effects, the longer-term effects are less clear,
particularly if the government fails to build on the opportunity.14
•• Recruitment. Damage to an insurgency’s resource base or organization may harm its recruitment efforts—either because they
demonstrate the insurgency’s weakness or limit its ability to reward
and protect supporters. But other events may directly affect rebel
recruitment. Particularly for insurgencies in which revolutionary or
religious fervor or communal solidarity play a greater role in motivating insurgent participation than do immediate material incentives,
major shifts in popular perception of “the narrative” of the conflict
might have significant effects on recruitment. If a government is able
to enact significant reforms, or it is able to protect authoritative figures
who challenge the legitimacy of “warlords,” the popular appeal of rebel
leaders may erode. Attrition strategies may also represent a means to
reach such a tipping point, but they usually require large-scale—and
protracted—interventions and are likely to fail if the opposing side

11     The divergent trajectories of Mozambique and Angola in the 1990s are revealing. After the
end of the Cold War, both countries lost superpower sponsorship for their warring factions. The
ready availability of oil and so-called “conflict diamonds” in Angola, however, helped to substitute
for superpower subsidies and permitted that conflict to continue for over a decade longer.
12     On the “decapitation” of insurgencies, see Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?
Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International
Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 47–79. On offering incentives to split insurgencies, see Sir Robert
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (1966; reprint, Saint
Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005).
13     Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?” Michael Tiernay, “Killing Kony: Leadership Change
and Civil War Termination,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (2013).
14     See, for instance, Michael L. Burgoyne, “The Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s
Fight against Sendero Luminoso,” Military Review (September-October 2010): 68–73.
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shows exceptional cohesion and commitment.15

Changes in the Benefits of Peace

Changes in the costs of continued fighting are not the only way in
which a war might take a decisive turn. Tipping points in a conflict might
also arise from changes in the anticipated benefits of peace. Credible
international peace operations to monitor and potentially enforce the
implementation of a peace deal provide one of the most important
means to make peace appear more attractive.16 The promise of economic assistance to make peace “pay” can also play an important role.17
Moreover, by inducing moderate factions to support peace, they may
also facilitate military victory over the more extremist or criminal factions within an insurgency who are unwilling to accept a peace founded
on compromise. Combining peace operations with offensive military
operations designed to defeat “spoilers” can pose difficult challenges,
but such a balancing act has been performed by international forces in
Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere.

Changes in Perceptions

Ultimately, what matters less than the costs of war or the benefits
of peace is the parties’ perceptions of them. Systematically assessing the
ways in which perceptions diverge from underlying realities is beyond
the scope of this article. Numerous observers, however, emphasize two
points in time at which perceptions of wars’ costs and benefits may shift
in important ways.
First, the onset of war offers important information to the leadership of all sides. Wars are typically caused by misjudgments of other
parties’ capabilities or intentions. Once violence escalates, leaders may
quickly adjust their expectations. Wars may begin, for instance, when
one party—either the government or insurgents—resorts to violence
based on the expectation of a quick victory due to either the element of
surprise or the expectation that the opposition will be unable to overcome internal divisions and quickly organize resistance. In such cases, if
the initial onslaught is thwarted, the attacker may seek to defuse tensions
rapidly rather than committing to a lengthy conflict. In cases of foreign
military intervention, the initial days and months of a conflict may indelibly shape a population’s perception of the invader’s intentions, as in the
concept of the “golden hour” used to explain the escalating violence in
the months after the 2003 US intervention in Iraq.18
If a war is not defused in its very early stages, it will typically endure
for an extended period as the warring parties accumulate information on
the others’ capabilities and willingness to endure prolonged bloodshed.
When neither side is able to defeat the other, the parties may eventually
come to a common understanding of the costs of continued fighting
15     John E. Mueller, “The Search for the ‘Breaking Point’ in Vietnam: The Statistics of a Deadly
Quarrel,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 4 (December 1980): 497–519.
16     Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51,
no. 3 (Summer, 1997).
17     Carrie Manning and Monica Malbrough, “Bilateral Donors and Aid Conditionality in PostConflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Mozambique,” Journal of Modern African Studies 48, no. 1 (March,
2010): 143–169.
18     James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington,
DC: Potomac Books, 2007).
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and the probabilities of success on the battlefield. At this point, William
Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate” is reached, potentially representing another juncture in the conflict at which events may turn decisively.
It is important to note that not all conflicts have clear tipping points.
Identifiable tipping points on the path toward durable conflict termination are relatively uncommon in part because truly decisive outcomes
in wars are rare. Many if not most conflicts do not end decisively.
Approximately half or less of politically inclusive countries with weak
state institutions, for instance, return to war within five years of the
end of a conflict.19 Since insurgencies so frequently draw on existing
social networks for recruiting, they retain a strong ability to reconstitute
themselves even after suffering substantial setbacks.20 Even conflicts
that end decisively may have no identifiable tipping point; instead, they
tend to come to an end through a gradual process of stalemate (as in the
Northern Ireland conflict or Mali’s civil war in the 1990s) or attrition (as
in post-Soviet Russia’s second Chechen war).

Small-Scale Interventions and Tipping the Balance

From a policy perspective, more interesting than the examples previously mentioned concerning wars in which tipping points are clearly
identifiable, are cases that may have had potential tipping points but
failed to “tip” in the government’s favor. Is it possible for outsiders to
influence outcomes at these critical moments? And if so, what might
such policies look like?
The previous discussion suggests at least six mechanisms through
which external interveners might use “small footprint” interventions to
induce decisive changes in an internal conflict:
•• Early intervention. Early intervention—seizing advantage of the
so-called golden hour—may help tip conflict dynamics in at least a
couple of ways. First, counterinsurgents can attempt to disrupt rebel
organizations before they grow robust and resilient. Second, counterinsurgents can help to set both popular and insurgent perceptions of
the government’s will and ability to fight in the early days of the war,
while expectations are still relatively fluid.
•• Resource interdiction. As discussed previously, the end of state
financing has often played a decisive role in conflicts. In most cases
state support for insurgents has ended either due to diplomatic efforts
or to factors internal to the state sponsor, but military operations
can also play a role. NATO airstrikes, for instance, were one of the
factors that led Serbia to threaten to eliminate support for Serbian
militias in Bosnia, thus bringing the ethnic Serbs to the negotiating
table.21 Military operations to interdict criminal trafficking are sub19     Stephen Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions
in Local Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, RR-513-SRF, 2014).
20     For one revealing case study, see Maya M. Christensen and Mats Utas, “Mercenaries of
Democracy: The ‘Politricks’ of Remobilized Combatants in the 2007 General Elections, Sierra
Leone,” African Affairs 107, no. 429 (2008): 515–539.
21     Although these airstrikes were one of the factors that led to the Dayton Accords, they were
clearly only one factor among many, and they likely were not the most important one. For a skeptical
view of the effectiveness of the airstrikes, see Office of Russian and European Analysis, Central
Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Vol. 1
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002).

On Military Interventions

Watts and Pezard

29

stantially more difficult, as the counternarcotics efforts in Colombia
and Afghanistan have demonstrated. Typically, there are too many
channels for contraband for military interdiction efforts to be decisive; however, there may be some exceptions. While contraband is
highly mobile, markets are not. Cutting off insurgents from access to
critical markets—as the United States did in the Battle of Sadr City
and the Kenyans did by denying al Shabaab the markets and ports of
Mogadishu and Kismayo in Somalia—can play important, if seldom
truly decisive, roles.22 Where rebels are dependent on heavy weapons
and armored vehicles—such as the Serbian militias in Bosnia—military operations may deny them the fuel they need to remain mobile.
•• Decapitation. As discussed above, successfully targeting top insurgent leadership can also be effective, particularly in the short to
medium term. Intervention by technologically sophisticated powers
like the United States may offer significant technical advantages in
targeting rebel leadership.23
•• Splitting strategies. Interveners may either help induce splits
among rebel groups or take advantage of pre-existing ones. Providing
resources to the government may help the government offer more
incentives to defecting rebels, and external military assistance may
help the government protect rebel defectors who might otherwise
fear reprisals from their former brothers-in-arms. Policies designed
to induce splits among rebel groups are a two-edged sword, however.
Inducements such as the promise of amnesty and redress of certain
grievances (for example, land reform) have been used to pry rebels
away from an insurgency and to provide intelligence on remaining
insurgents, thus leading to the cascading effects typical of a tipping
point. On the other hand, fracturing an insurgency into multiple factions may make a conflict harder to terminate through a negotiated
settlement because no single leadership can speak for the rebels.24 If
the government is too weak to offer meaningful inducements to rebel
defectors or to protect them, splitting strategies may create greater
incoherence among rebels without any corresponding strategic gains.
•• Strengthening pro-peace constituencies. Warring factions often
have a material interest in the criminal economies that form during
wartime and may even seek to perpetuate conflict as a means to profit.
Consequently, one of the most powerful means of drawing away
support from insurgents may be by strengthening those portions of
society—such as the licit business community—that have a vested
interest in peace. Some religious leaders may also have an interest in
peace, particularly since periods of conflict often draw power away
from traditional sources of authority (such as religious leaders and
elders) and concentrate it in the hands of military leaders and warlords.
To the extent that outside interveners can protect and strengthen these
pro-peace constituencies, they may be able to undermine the recruiting
22     David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RR-160-A, 2011).
23     Sean D. Naylor, “Years of Detective Work Led to al-Qaida Target,” Army Times, November
21, 2011; and David Spencer, “The Sword of Honor Campaign in the Cauca Valley: 2011-2013
Colombian Conflict Focus of Effort,” Small Wars Journal, May 31, 2013.
24     David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” American Journal of Political
Science 50, no. 4 (October, 2006): 875–892.
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potential of rebel leaders. Providing protection and support to such a
large, dispersed group of actors, however, is extremely difficult to do
through “light footprint” military operations unless the major parties
to the conflict have already accepted a negotiated settlement (as in
consensual peace operations).
•• “Playing for the breaks.” Finally, in many cases, small-scale foreign
interventions will neither create tipping points nor take advantage of
them to bring a conflict to an end. Rather, they will simply prevent
the defeat of a partner government.25 Given sufficient time, either
the international environment may shift in favorable ways, or the
insurgents may make mistakes that the government can capitalize on.
Both the intervener and the partner government, in other words, are
“playing for the breaks.”26 Such an approach minimizes the risk of
over-reach by either the intervening state or the partner government.
On the other hand, it is not clear that countries like the United States
can sustain foreign military interventions indefinitely, and there are
significant spillover costs associated with long-running conflicts.27
This brief overview of the mechanisms by which external interveners may seek to capitalize on tipping points suggests many of the
difficulties of successfully implementing such a policy. To fully understand the challenges the United States may face in attempting to tip
conflicts in favor of partner regimes through small-footprint operations,
it is helpful to examine a number of recent cases.

Recent Small-Footprint Interventions: A Complex Record

Analysts have frequently invoked the examples of recent US operations in the Philippines and Colombia to argue in favor of small-footprint
interventions. This article instead examines a variety of lesser-known
cases, in part because the Philippines and Colombia have been so
thoroughly analyzed elsewhere and in part because these interventions
remain ongoing, with the final outcome still to be determined.

Russian Intervention in Tajikistan

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Tajikistan’s emergence as an independent state, a civil war rapidly evolved between the
country’s Communists and supporters of the democratic and Islamist
opposition. Although initially reluctant to become involved in the conflict, growing concern over Islamic radicalism and narcotics trafficking
ultimately prompted Russia to intervene.
Russia possessed by far the largest and most capable fighting force in
Tajikistan, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, and it largely controlled
the Border Forces along the border with Afghanistan. These forces were
present in Tajikistan from the beginning of the war and began to act
on behalf of the pro-Russian leader Emomali Rakhmon after he seized
control of the government in December 1992 and relegated the Islamists
25     Stephen Watts et al., The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, MG-1226-RC, 2012).
26     Lincoln B. Krause, “Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn
2009): 48–64.
27     For spillover costs, see Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development
Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), Chapter 2.
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and others to the role of an armed opposition movement, the United
Tajik Opposition (UTO). Russia, therefore, had the opportunity to tip
the conflict in a favorable direction due to its early intervention and its
potential to interdict the UTO’s supply routes from Afghanistan.28
Despite these opportunities, the war raged for five years. Rather
than tipping the conflict toward a decisive outcome, Russian support
did little more than keep the Rakhmon regime from disintegrating. The
Border Forces were incapable of interdicting the UTO’s supply routes
from Afghanistan, in part because of the inherent difficulty of policing
a long and mountainous border and in part because Russian and government forces were themselves complicit in the smuggling.29
In 1997, Moscow helped broker a peace deal between the Rakhmon
government and the UTO featuring numerous power-sharing mechanisms. Within the first few years after the treaty was signed, however,
Rakhmon engineered the removal of many opposition figures from the
governmental positions they won as a result of the peace accords, and a
number of prominent opposition politicians were assassinated. In 1999,
the president won reelection with 97 percent of the vote. In part as a
consequence, much political power in the country has remained concentrated in informal institutions beyond the control of the state. In most
cases the various warlords of the civil war period retained the loyalty and
capabilities of their paramilitaries, allowing them to remain the de facto
political authorities of much of Tajikistan.
Both narcotics trafficking and Islamic radicalism have flourished in
this environment. Through its intervention, in other words, Russia was
able to keep its preferred leader in power, helped to end the country’s
civil war, and helped to keep the country at peace afterward. But its
intervention did little to ameliorate the main factors driving its intervention in the first place.30

French Intervention in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) has historically been an
extremely weak state with small security forces and little penetration
into the regions beyond the capital of Bangui. From the time of its independence it has been subject to repeated coups and governed for more
than half of its existence as a modern, independent state by rulers who
seized power by force.31
France had played a significant role in the country’s politics since its
independence, maintaining a military base in the country and subsidizing the CAR’s armed forces, the Forces armees centrafricaines (FACA). In
28     Lena Jonson, The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy, Discussion Paper 74 (London: Royal
Institute for International Affairs, 1998); and Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The
Cases of Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
29     Sergei Gretzky, Russia’s Policy Toward Central Asia (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center,
1997); Barnett R. Rubin, “Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and
Consequences of the Civil War in Tajikistan,” in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building,
eds. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (London: Routledge, 1998).
30     Nasrin Dadmehr, “Tajikistan: Regionalism and Weakness,” in State Failure and State Weakness
in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003);
International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats, Asia Report No. 205 (May 24,
2011); International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, Asia Report No. 30 (December 24,
2001).
31     Andreas Mehler, “Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and
the Central African Republic,” Armed Forces & Society 38, no. 1 (2012): 49–69.
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part as a result of the end of these subsidies in 1993, government payments of FACA wages fell deeply into arrears, ultimately leading several
hundred soldiers to mutiny in 1996.32
France was well-positioned to intervene at the beginning of the
conflict, when it had the opportunity to impress upon the mutineers the
costs of fighting and to disrupt their nascent organization. In Operations
Almadin I and Almadin II, French forces put down two coup attempts
in a matter of days in April and May 1996. France helped broker a series
of peace deals involving the payment of back wages (by France), an
amnesty for the mutineers, and ultimately a broader power-sharing
deal (the Bangui Accords) monitored first by the African peacekeeping
mission MISAB and later by the UN mission MINURCA. Thus, France
seized on many of the strategies that might be expected to tip a conflict
decisively in favor of the government. It acted at the very beginning of
the crisis. By paying back wages to FACA soldiers, France could potentially split those mutineers with limited and legitimate grievances (wage
arrears) from those with broader ambitions. And by helping to create a
power-sharing agreement buttressed by external peacekeepers, France
hoped to strengthen constituencies for peace.
Despite these efforts, another major coup attempt was launched a
year after the foreign peacekeeping presence finally withdrew. Three
years after the end of MINURCA and seven years after France had
intervened, the government France had helped to prop up was overthrown.33 That government, in turn, was itself overthrown within a
decade. The conflict, in other words, failed to tip decisively.

African Interventions in Somalia

A wide variety of observers—ranging from the Secretary General
of the United Nations to reporters and academics—have suggested
that Somalia may have reached or passed a tipping point in the past
couple of years.34 Thanks to a conjunction of events: the end of the
country’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and inauguration of
the internationally recognized Somali Federal Government (SFG) in
2012; the fracturing among the various factions of al Shabaab and its
loss of popular support; and the military successes of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF)
against al Shabaab—Somalia seemed finally close to a possible victory
against insurgent Islamist groups and to a functional government in
Mogadishu.
Somalia has experienced four foreign military interventions since
2006: by Ethiopia (in 2006–09 and again since 2012); by AMISOM
(since 2008); and by Kenya (since 2011). Although the first Ethiopian
intervention was widely considered a disaster and resulted in larger
32     Fiona McFarlane and Mark Malan, “Crisis and Response in the Central African Republic: A
New Trend in African Peacekeeping?” African Security Review 7, no. 2 (1998): 48–58; Watts et al., The
Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions, 77–83.
33     Watts et al., The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions, 77–83; Gabriella Ingerstad,
Willing and Able? Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-war States: Insights from the Central African
Republic (Stockholm: Ministry of Defense, October 2012).
34     United Nations Security Council, “Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,”
S/2012/74 (January 31, 2012), 9; veteran Somalia observer Ken Menkhaus offered a more measured judgment—see Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia at the Tipping Point?” Current History (May 2012):
169–174.
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support for al Shabaab, interventions by AMISOM and Kenya have had
very different results, in part because these countries were not perceived
as negatively as Ethiopia. In these interventions, Kenya, AMISOM,
the Somali government, and other external players such as the United
States attempted to use several of the mechanisms described herein to
ensure their interventions would lead to decisive changes. Kenya and
AMISOM contributed to cutting al Shabaab’s revenue by taking control
of Mogadishu, whose markets and businesses represented an important
source of revenue for the group, and Kismayo, which is a major port
and a hub for the charcoal trade that sustained al Shabaab. Decapitation
was also employed: US-targeted killings of top operatives, such as Aden
Hashi Ayro in 2008, have played a disruptive role and may have compelled the group to rely on leaders of lesser quality.35 AMISOM and the
KDF have also taken advantage of ideological splits within al Shabaab.
The relative peace that Mogadishu was experiencing as of late 2013 has
led many in the Somali diaspora to return; this population represents a
pro-peace constituency that has everything to gain from a lasting stabilization of the country. Their increasing presence and investments in
Mogadishu may eventually act as a tipping point by creating incentives
for more groups to invest in licit business opportunities rather than
profiting from wartime economies.
There are limits, however, to what has been achieved in Somalia. It is
unclear whether the loss of Mogadishu and Kismayo represents a tipping
point for al Shabaab, which has proven highly capable of diversifying its
sources of revenue from taxation of populations to weapons trafficking
and piracy. The group is still reaping considerable benefits from the
charcoal business of Kismayo, which a recent UN report claimed had
been revived and even expanded, in part with the complicity of Kenyan
forces.36 It is also worth noting that many of the setbacks experienced by
al Shabaab were brought about by the group’s own misguided policies,
such as the mishandling of the 2010–12 famine and the resulting loss
of popular support and recruits. External interveners benefitted from
these mistakes, which may make their achievements difficult to replicate
in the future; insurgents, after all, are as capable of learning from their
mistakes as are counterinsurgents. Perhaps most importantly, the optimism that accompanied the SFG’s creation only a year ago has already
started to fade. Thus far the SFG has proven itself nearly as corrupt
and weak as its predecessors.37 Without a capable and inclusive government to attract potential defectors from among rebel populations and
to protect and reward pro-peace constituencies, even potential tipping
points are highly unlikely to tip.
Somalia, however, may have tipped toward a change in the nature of
its conflict. It is still unclear the extent to which al Shabaab has morphed
from a Somalia-centered group that seeks to control large swathes of
territory and could aim to take over the central government to a mainly
terrorist group that operates indifferently between Somalia and other
35     Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Somalia,” The New
York Times, May 2, 2008; Interview by authors with subject matter expert, Washington DC. October
2013.
36     United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (July 12,
2013), paragraph 152.
37     See, for instance, Matt Bryden, Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2013).

34

Parameters 44(1) Spring 2014

countries in the region. A series of events affecting al Shabaab over
the past few years has certainly pushed it toward the latter direction.
Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Godane’s rejection of humanitarian aid during the
2010–12 famine that killed an estimated quarter million people created a
rift between al Shabaab and the population and within the group itself.38
This happened at a time when the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops
took away one of al Shabaab’s main rallying causes, the resistance to
the Ethiopian “invasion.” Popular support had been the backbone of al
Shabaab’s rise during the Ethiopian intervention (2006–09). It provided
the group with recruits and facilitated the acceptance of its presence in
entire regions of Somalia. This territorial control, in turn, represented an
important source of revenue. Although much about al Shabaab’s internal
dynamics is still unknown, there are indications that the group’s loss
of popular support, combined with improved military performance
on the part of AMISOM, may have had a cumulative effect. Groups
that cannot recruit easily often turn to coercive methods; this further
antagonizes populations, which in turn are less likely to join the group
voluntarily. Imposing taxation on a smaller population base may have
the same effect. The combination of al Shabaab missteps with improved
AMISOM capabilities, in other words, does not appear to have tipped
Somalia toward an end to its violence, but it may well have tipped the
conflict to a phase in which forces hostile to the current government
are unable to pose an existential threat. Even this result, however, is
likely dependent on the continued presence of international forces for
the foreseeable future.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Tipping points are seldom defined, and seem to signify little more
than an important change—or possible change—in a conflict. We have
argued that “tipping points” should be seen as a conjunction of conditions sufficient (or usually sufficient) to achieve an end of the conflict or
a transformation of its character. The purpose of this article has been
to flesh out this concept and its implications for small-footprint military
interventions in support of partner governments. The very short descriptions of the post-Cold War conflicts in Tajikistan, the Central African
Republic, and Somalia, as well as the even briefer mentions of other
conflicts, have not been intended as rigorous empirical tests. Rather,
they were intended to serve as illustrations of conflict and intervention
dynamics at particular points in time that had the potential to be tipping
points. Although we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from the
illustrative cases, they do nonetheless offer a number of insights.
First, the term tipping point is almost certainly overused. The term
is invoked by analysts far more frequently than they actually occur. If this
question were only one of semantics, then playing fast-and-loose with
the term would be harmless. But the term implies something substantive about a conflict: that its dynamics are likely to change in ways that
fundamentally alter the course of the war. Seeing tipping points where
none exist thus overstates the likelihood that conflicts can be decisively
38     Mary Hope Schwoebel, “Déjà Vu: Famine and Crisis in Somalia,” (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace (USIP), September 12, 2011); United Nations Food and Agricultural
Program (UN FAO) and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), Mortality Among
Populations of Southern and Central Somalia Affected by Severe Food Insecurity and Famine During 2010–2012
(Rome and Washington, May 2, 2013), 53.
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resolved—and, as a corollary, the likelihood that military interventions
can take advantage of these opportunities to secure durable changes that
favor the strategic interests of the United States. In the cases of Tajikistan,
the Central African Republic, and Somalia, external forces intervened
at points in time and in ways that could be expected to be particularly
favorable. Yet in neither Tajikistan nor the Central African Republic
did interventions tip the course of a conflict toward a decisive conclusion. In the CAR, France secured a temporary peace that was quickly
reversed once French forces and peacekeepers withdrew. In Tajikistan,
Russia secured an enduring end to the civil war, but the post-conflict
state that emerged was so weak that it was unable to make significant
gains against either radical Islam or illegal narcotics trafficking—the
primary interests that prompted Russian intervention. In Somalia, it is
too early to say if the events of the past two years have created the basis
for conflict termination or enduring gains in the strength of the Somali
state. Recent events suggest that a decisive end to the conflict is unlikely,
although the conflict may have entered a lengthy phase characterized
more by transnational terrorism and lower-intensity violence than full
civil war. Even this result, however, is almost certainly dependent on the
continued willingness of AMISOM troop-contributing countries (especially Uganda and Kenya) to maintain a substantial presence in Somalia.
Tipping points do occur in some cases. The elimination of state
support for an insurgency has often led to a decisive end to a conflict,
particularly when the conflict-affected state does not have ready alternatives to support insurgency on a large scale (such as “conflict diamonds”
or oil deposits readily controlled by rebels). Decapitation of insurgent
groups has sometimes had decisive effects, particularly when the government is capable of exploiting the opportunity by offering reconcilable
insurgent groups credible positive inducements (such as amnesty and an
economic stake in peace).
The evidence in favor of many other potential tipping points is much
weaker. Early interventions, for instance, did not help Russia, France, or
Ethiopia. Although support for a partner government might be particularly effective if provided before a conflict escalates to the point of war,
once a conflict does escalate, golden hours seldom appear to represent
true tipping points. Similarly, if a government is not strong enough to
act decisively, “wedge strategies” designed to split insurgent groups can
lead simply to a more fractious opposition incapable of negotiating an
end to conflict. Somalia’s TFG, for instance, did not secure any lasting
gain from its co-optation of moderate Islamist opposition. Efforts to
cut insurgents off from their black market revenues are seldom as decisive as ending state support to insurgents. Illicit trafficking is extremely
difficult to interdict fully, and often the intervening forces of poorer
states become captured by the criminal economies they are trying to
police—an outcome observed in the Tajikistan and Somalia cases examined in this article and in many other instances. Finally, strengthening
constituencies for peace is ultimately necessary to bring a decisive end
to conflict, but without a large-scale stability operation of the sort the
United States currently seeks to avoid, the empowerment of pro-peace
constituencies is usually the outcome of conflict rather than a tipping point
itself.
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Small-footprint interventions may help the United States secure at
least partial successes by weakening dangerous adversaries or by providing partner regimes a temporary reprieve in which to reform themselves.
The examples offered here and many others, however, suggest their
effects will usually not be decisive. Most conflicts, in other words, fail to
tip decisively, even at particularly opportune junctures.
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